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certainty the Legislature might well consider the adoption of
the federal practice. The probable decrease of reversals on
technical grounds would seem ample justification for such legislative action. But, in addition to this end, the aim of rendering justice to the defendant should be considered. Wigmore
has said that this "unfortunate departure from the orthodox
common law rule . .. has done more than any other one thing

to impair the general efficiency of jury trial as an instrument
of justice." 47 Another authority has said that a rule such as
Louisiana's "tends to debase a trial by jury into a contest of
skill between opposing counsel," and that "it deprives the jury
of the opinion of the only impartial expert present." 48 Perhaps
the most appropriate criticism isone made of the former Illinois
practice which, prior to the passage of the Illinois Civil Practice Act,49 had the same limit on the trial judge that Louisiana
has now: "Under our system, verdicts of juries are, in the main,
the result of chance and compromise. They are influenced by
prejudice and passion. Newspapers have it in their power to
increase or decrease the volume of convictions or acquittals. Not
infrequently they influence the verdict in a specific case ...
Only by placing the responsibility upon the judges to supervise
the trial properly, advise and guide the jury, can the evils of
the present system be minimized." 50
The logic of the attacks on restricting the trial judge seems
sound. The evil of an excessive number of technical reversals is
apparent. Some states, recognizing this evil, have adopted the
federal rule." 1 Louisiana would do well to follow suit.
Robert J. Jones

Dedication of Land to Public Use
Three methods by which land may be dedicated to public use
have been recognized by the courts of this state. These are: (a)
statutory dedication, (b) "tacit" dedication, and (c) implied
47. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 557, § 255 (3d ed. 1940).
48. Ibid.
49. ILL. REV. STAT. C. 110, §§ 125-259.72 (Smith-lHurd 1948).
50. Fisher, The Effect of the Civil Practice Act Upon Instructing Juries in
Criminal Cases, 28 ILL. L. REV. 451, 457 (1933).
51. Illinois, Michigan, South Dakota, Colorado, Maine and Massachusetts have
adopted the Federal Rules either by statute or by judicial decision. ORrTLD,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 458 (1947).
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dedication. The purpose of this Comment is to analyze the three
types of dedication in the light of jurisprudential development.
Statutory Dedication
This mode of dedication is provided for in R.S. 33:5051,'
which indicates the procedure to be followed when creating a
subdivision in a municipality or parish. The statute states that
a landowner must file a map with the registrar of conveyances
of the parish, describing the lots, streets and alleyways, together
with the names and dimensions of each. The owner is also
obliged to make a formal dedication of "the streets, alleys and
public squares or plats shown on the map to public use."2 In Life
v. Griffins the court of appeal held that substantial compliance
4
with the provisions is sufficient to complete the dedication.
Likewise, in Collins v. Zander 5 it was declared that "the dedica1. LA. R.S. 33:5051 (1950) : "Whenever the owner of any real estate desires
to lay off the same into squares or lots with streets or alleys between the squares
or lots with the intention of selling or offering for sale any of the squares or
lots, he shall, before selling any square or lot or any portion of same, cause
the real estate to be surveyed and platted or subdivided by a licensed surveyor
or civil engineer into lots or blocks, or both, each designated by number, and set
stakes at all of the corners of every lot and block thereof, properly marked so
as to designate the correct number of each lot and block; write the legal description of the land on the plat or map, and cause to be made and filed in the office
of the keeper of notarial records of the parish wherein the property is situated
and copied into the conveyance record book of such parish, and a duplicate thereof
filed with the assessor of the parish a correct map of the real estate so divided,
which map shall contain the following:
"(1) The section, township, and range in which such real estate or subdivision
thereof lies according to government survey.
"(2) The number of squares by numerals from 1 up, and the dimensions of
each square in feet and inches.
"(3) The number of each lot or subdivision of a square and its dimensions
in feet and inches.
"(4) The name of each street and alley and its length and width in feet and
inches.
"(5) The name or number of each square or plat dedicated to public use.
"(6) A certificate of the parish surveyor or any other licensed surveyor or
civil engineer of this state approving said map and stating that the same is in
accordance with the provisions of this Section and -with the laws and ordinances
of the parish in which the property is situated.
"(7) A formal dedication made by the owner or owners of the property or
their duty authorized agent of all the streets, alleys and public squares or plats
shown on the map to public use."
2. It has been suggested that the language of the statute is broad enough to
include a method by which dedication of land for other purposes (such as a
cemetery) may be accomplished. See Note, 16 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 582
(1956).
3. 197 So. 646 (La. App. 1940).
4. Accord: Metairie Park v. Currie, 168 La. 588, 122 So. 859 (1929) (formal
dedication requirement not complied with) ; Sliman v. Village of Palmeto, 145
So. 410 (La. App. 1933) (plat filed in the office of the keeper of notarial records
but not copied into the conveyance record book).
5. 61 So.2d 897 (La. App. 1952).
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tion becomes complete immediately upon the recordation of the
plan or map and substantial compliance with Act 134 of 1896."
Perhaps the leading case on statutory dedication is ArkansasLouisiana Gas Co. v. Parker Oil Co.0 There it was stated, first,
that a dedication in compliance with the statute is complete in
itself and does not require*an acceptance, and, second, that by
this method of dedication the public authority acquires not a
servitude, but complete ownership of the designated property.
These principles are reiterated in subsequent decisions and seem
7
to be well settled.
"Tacit" Dedication
Originally, R.S. 48:4918 provided a method by which a parish
could acquire a right in a road. As amended by act 639 of 1954,
the statute provides that "all roads and streets ... which have
been or are hereafter kept up, maintained or worked for three
years by authority of any parish governing authority ... or by
authority of any municipal governing authority ...shall be public roads or streets as the case may be."
(Emphasis added.)
Under this statute the "working and maintaining" must be serious 10 and must be done without coercion of the landowner. 1 On
the other hand, an intention to dedicate is not necessary ;12 it is
sufficient that the parish or municipal governing authority has
worked the road or street for the required period without protest by the landowner. 13
6. 190 La. 957, 183 So. 229 (1938).
7. B. F. Trappey's Sons v. City of New Iberia, 225 La. 466, 73 So.2d 423
(1954) (dictum); Emery v. Orleans Levee Board, 207 La. 386, 21 So.2d 418
(1945) (dictum) ; Collins v. Zander, 61 So.2d 897 (La. App. 1952) ; Brasseaux
v. Ducote, 6 So.2d 769 (La. App. 1942) (dictum) ; Life v. Griffith, 197 So. 646
(La. App. 1940) (dictum).
8.LA. R.S. 48:491 (1950) : "All roads or streets in this state that are opened,
laid out or appointed by virtue of any act of the legislature or by virtue of an
order of any parish governing authority in any parish, or any municipal governing authority in any municipality, or which have been or are hereafter kept up,
maintained or worked for a period of three years by authority of any parish
governing authority in its parish or by authority of any municipal governing
authority in its municipality shall be public roads or streets as the case may be.
Also all roads or streets made on the front of their respective tracts of lands
by individuals when the lands have their front on any of the rivers or bayous
within this state shall be public roads when located outside of municipalities and
shall be public streets when located inside of municipalities."
9. Part of the original act, providing for an arbitrary measure of compensation for deprivation of the land, was declared unconstitutional in Gibbon v. Parish
of St. Mary, 140 La. 854, 74 So. 172 (1916).
10. Bordelon v. Heard, 33 So.2d 88 (La. App. 1947).
11. Elliot v. Evangeline Parish, 132 So. 368 (La. App. 1931).
12. Porter v. Hickabay, 50 So.2d 684 (La. App. 1951).
13. Fontenot v. Veillon, 72 So.2d 587 (La. App. 1954). The court of appeal
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A recent case involving "tacit" dedication is Wharton v. City
of Alexandria1 4 where the plaintiff opposed the paving of a
street on the ground that it had never been dedicated. It was
conceded that no formal dedication had taken place, but the
street had been in public use for twenty-five years and had been
worked and maintained by the police jury of the parish for a
period in excess of three years. In applying the statute the
court said: "[T]he courts of this state have interpreted the
law to mean just what it says and have held that a road is tacitly
dedicated as such when it has been maintained as a public road
by the police jury and worked from time to time by road gangs
under the authority of the police jury for three years."' 15 Nevertheless, it has been consistently held that the statute does not
provide a method by which police juries or municipalities may
obtain ownership of the land needed for public road or street purposes, but that it only provides a means of acquiring a servitude
of passage. 16
Implied Dedication
Implied dedication, the most commonly recognized method,
has been acknowledged by the courts as another way of dedicating land of various descriptions to public uses. This method
is more often applicable to roads and streets, but it has also been
applied to parks, 17 squares, 8 cemeteries, 19 sidewalks, 20 and an
"open space."' 2 1 Its fundamental basis was well expressed in
22
an early United States Supreme Court case, Cincinnativ. White,
by the statement: "[T] here is no particular form necessary to
a dedication of land to public use. All that is required is the
assent of the owner of the land, and the fact of its being used
for the purposes intended. ' 23 Although there are earlier Louheld that certain roads -were public notwithstanding the fact that the police jury
had no written right of way and had never adopted a resolution declaring the
roads to be public.
14. 77 So.2d 1 (La. App. 1954).
15. Id. at 2.
16. Paret v. Louisiana Highway Commission, 178 La. 454, 151 So. 768 (1933)
Fuselier v. Iberia, 109 La. 551, 33 So. 597 (1903); Bradley v. Pharr, 45 La.
Ann. 426, 12 So. 618, 19 L.R.A. 647 (1893).
17. Town of Vinton v. Lyons, 131 La. 673, 60 So. 54 (1912) ; Town of Kenner
v. Zito, 13 Orl. App. 465 (La. App. 1916).
18. New Orleans v. Carrollton Land Co., 131 La. 1092, 60 So. 695 (1913).
19. Locke v. Lester, 78 So.2d 14 (La. App. 1955).
20. Collins v. Zander, 61 So.2d 897 (La. App. 1952).
21. Shreveport v. Walpole, 22 La. Ann. 526 (1870); Pickett v. Brown, 18
La. Ann. 560 (1866).
22. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 431 (1832).
23. Id. at 431.
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isiana decisions reaching the same result, this decision has
been the authority most cited by the courts of this state in deciding cases of implied dedication. The two requirements of the
quoted passage have been assimilated to an offer and an acceptance, the assent of the landowner constituting an offer, and
the mere use by the public constituting an acceptance. 24 While
neither of these requirements need be formally expressed, it
2
must be unequivocally shown that both are met.
Application of the doctrine usually occurs where there has
been a map of a subdivision or town prepared and lots then
sold with reference to the map. A typical illustration of how
such dedication comes about can be found in the cases dealing
with the Town of Carrollton that later became a part of the
City of New Orleans by act 71 of 1874. The founders of the
town had a plan of the old McCarthy plantation made, dividing
it into squares of portions of land, numbered and bounded by
streets and avenues. Many lots and parts of lots were sold by
the owners and their vendors by reference to the map. In one
of the cases the court found the streets and avenues shown on
the map to be public. 20 In a later case a square, designated on
the plan as "Frederick Square," was also declared public.2 7 As
the bases for its holdings the court found first an intention on
the part of the landowners to make the property public and
second an actual use by the people of New Orleans. A similar
dedication was found to have existed in the minds of the original
planners of the City of Shreveport. 28 On the original map of
that city, a plot of ground was shown that has been referred to
by the courts as the "open space." This space, which bordered
on the river, was held to be dedicated because it was "intended
by the founders to be a dedication for public uses, made on a
large and liberal scale, commensurate with their views of the
future importance and large commerce of their newly estab24. Collins v. Zander, 61 So.2d 897 (La. App. 1952) ; Robinson, Dedication
of Streets and Alleyways in Louisiana, 25 TUL. L. REv. 88 (1950).
25. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Parker Oil Co., 190 La. 957, 183 So. 229
(1938) ; Landry v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 166 La. 1609, 118 So. 142 (1928) ;
Bomar v. Baton Rouge, 162 La. 342, 110 So. 497 (1926) ; Saulet v. New Orleans,
10 'La. Ann. 81 (1855). In a situation involving a sale of lots with reference to
a map showing the land in question, the acceptance is found in the purchase by
the public. Town of Vinton v. Lyons, 131 La. 673, 60 So. 54 (1912) ; Flournoy
v. Beard, 116 La. 224, 40 So. 684 (1906) ; Shreveport v. Walpole, 22 La. Ann.
526 (1870).
26. 9 La. Ann. 244 (1854).
27. 131 La. 1092, 60 So. 695 (1913).
28. Shreveport v. Walpole, 22 La. Ann. 526 (1870); Pickett v. Brown, 18
La. Ann. 560 (1866).
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lished town." 9 A recent case in which an intention to dedicate
was found is Locke v. Lester.80 There no map was involved, but
a dedication of a graveyard was found. As its reason the court
stated: "[T] he graveyard has been continuously used for more
than half a century, and subsequent to 1941 its grounds have
been carefully tended. Burial is, and always has been open to
the general public. There are no restrictions or conditions imposed upon the right to be buried in this cemetery, nor is there
any regulatory authority. Maintenance is achieved through
voluntary efforts of those who have relatives interred there." 31
An intention to dedicate must be demonstrated so as to exclude any other rational hypothesis, 8 2 for in several cases a lack
of intention to dedicate has been found.8 3 In New Orleans v.
Heirs of Guillote3 4 sales were made with reference to a map
which contained a plot of ground with an inscription describing
the plot as a market. The court, in rejecting the plaintiff's contention that the land had been dedicated to public use, stated
that a market is not necessarily public property, but may be the
object of individual ownership. Likewise, in Livaudais and David
v. Municipality No. Two"5 it was declared that churches are
usually considered private property, and their appearance on
certain blocks of a map referred to in the sale of lots did not
constitute a dedication of the blocks.
In addition to a finding of intention to dedicate, implied
dedication has sometimes been based on estoppel in pais.386 In
the cases where such a conclusion was reached, the land in question had been used with the assent of the owner for public pur29. Shreveport v. Walpole, 22 La. Ann. 526, 529 (1870).
30. 78 So.2d 14 (La. App. 1955).
31. Id. at 15.
32. Donaldson's Heirs v. New Orleans, 166 La. 1059, 118 So. 134 (1928)
Bomar v. Baton Rouge, 162 La. 342, 110 So. 497 (1926); Torres v. Falgoust,
37 La. Ann. 497 (1885); Kemp v. Town of Independence, 156 So. 56 (La. App.
1934). No one is presumed to give his land away, and the burden of proving a
divestiture is upon him who alleges it. Torres v. Falgoust, 37 La. Ann. 497 (1885).
33. Heirs of Joun David v. New Orleans, 16 La. Ann. 404 (1862) (dots on a
plat did not show intention); Saulet v. New Orleans, 10. La. Ann. 81 (1855)
(square colored yellow on a green map showed no intention to dedicate).
34. 14 La. Ann. 875 (1859).
35. 5 La. Ann. 8 (1850).
36. Ford v. Shreveport, 204 La. 618, 16 So.2d 127 (1943) ; Torres v. Falgoust,
37 La. Ann. 497 (1855) ; Saulet v. New Orleans, 10 La. Ann. 81 (1855). See
also BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951): "An estoppel in pais arises whenever one, by his conduct, affirmative or negative, intentionally or through culpable
negligence induces another to believe and have confidence in certain material facts,
and the latter, having the right to do so relies and acts thereon, and is, as a reasonable and inevitable consequence, misled to his injury."
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poses in such a manner as to exclude the idea of private ownership, and for such a length of time that the public accommodation and the rights of individuals would be seriously affected
by the interruption of the use.87 Thus, in the early case of Town
of Vinton v. Lyons 33 lots were sold with reference to a map
showing a park which was the subject of litigation. In finding
an estoppel in pais, the court said that setting aside the block
as a park "had the effect of increasing the value and desirability
of the other lots . .

.

.The law considers, under such circum-

stances, that the value of the land dedicated goes into the remaining property and is received by the owner in making sales
at an increased price." 89 In a more recent case, Ford v. Shreveport,40 an estoppel was found where there was no reference to
a plat. There a landowner was regarded as consenting to an
appropriation of a street because he sat idly by while the city
paved and the public used a strip for street purposes. Under
such circumstances, he was precluded from reclaiming the property. It should be noted, however, that mere use without more
4
will not constitute a dedication to the public. 1
Many of the cases dealing with implied dedication have not
decided what interest the public acquires in the land. Of the
cases in which the determination has been made, a majority
hold that the dedicated land became a public thing, the ownership of which, under Civil Code article 435, is vested in the
public generally. In Saulet v. New Orleans42 the court noted
that the Civil Code of 1825, in article 449 (now article 558),
provided for two types of common property. The first type may
be used by everyone, whereas the second type, though common
property, is not subject to common use, but may be employed
for the, advantage of the public by the city or parochial authorities. With reference to the latter type, the public interest must
be derived in some one of the modes recognized and sanctioned
by law. With reference to the first type, however, the rules which
prevail in private grants have been dispensed with,43 and the
37. Torres v. Falgoust, 37 La. Ann. 497 (1855).
38. 131 La. 673, 60 So. 54 (1912).
39. Id. at 678, 60 So. at 55.
40. 204 La. 518, 16 So.2d 127 (1943).
41. Bomar v. Baton Rouge, 162 La. 342, 110 So. 497 (1926).
42. 10 La. Ann. 81 (1855).
43. Visible signs of dedication and open use take the place of title and registry.
Anderson v. Thomas, 166 La. 512, 117 So. 573 (1928) ; Faunce v. New Orleans,
148 So. 57 (La. App. 1933).
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"broad principles of equity" have permitted a dedication to
44
public use based on intention or estoppel.
Some of the consequences of the view expressed in a majority of the cases are found in holdings that the land is not subject to prescription after being dedicated, 45 that neither the land
nor the rentals from such land are subject to seizure, 46 that no
possessory action may be brought by one possessing dedicated
property adverse to the public's claim, 47 and that the property
is inalienable by the city or parish. 48 These results stem from
Civil Code article 48249 which provides that "[T] here are things
... which, though naturally susceptible of ownership, may lose
this quality in consequence of their being applied to some public
purpose, incompatible with private ownership." It further provides that such things may regain the "quality" as soon as they
cease to be applied to the public purpose. The last provision of
the article was construed in McNeil v. Hicks.50 It was there held
that whenever the public interests may require it, the municipal
or parochial authorities may alienate public places, but only
with the consent of and by the authority of the sovereign. Hence,
under the view of a majority of the cases, in order for dedicated
land to regain the quality of being susceptible to private ownership, the State Legislature must consent to its alienation. At
first blush, this proposition seems to have been ignored by the
court in Tilton v. New Orleans Ry., 51 where it was held that the
city had the power to sell a right of way to the defendant rail44. Saulet v. New Orleans, 10 La. Ann. 81 (1855).
45. Kemp v. Town of Independence, 156 So. 56 (La. App. 1934) ; Faunce v.
New Orleans, 148 So. 57 (La. App. 1933).
46. Kline v. Parish of Ascension, 33 La. Ann. 562 (1881). "Property dedicated to public use cannot be the subject of private ownership. It is out of commerce and not liable to seizure .... [A] nd the revenues derived from such property itself, are destined for public use, and are likewise not liable to seizure."
47. Keefe v. City of Monroe, 120 So. 102 (La. App. 1929). "Mere physical
possession of public places which are not subject to private ownership is not such
possession as entitles the possessor to maintain himself against the public."
48. New Orleans v. Carrollton Land Co., 131 La. 1902, 60 So. 695 (1913);
Kline v. Parish of Ascension, 33 La. Ann. 562 (1881) ; Shreveport v. Walpole,
22 La. Ann. 526 (1870); Burthe v. Black and Town of Carrollton, 9 La. Ann.
244 (1854).
49. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 482 (1870) : "Among those which are not susceptible
of ownership, there are some which can never become the object of it; as things
in common, of which all men have the enjoyment and use.
"There are things, on the contrary, which, though naturally susceptible of
ownership, may lose this quality in consequence of their being applied to some
public purpose, incompatible with private ownership; but which resume this
quality as soon as they cease to be applied to that purpose; such as the high
roads, streets and public places."
50. 34 La. Ann. 1090 (1822).
51. 35 La. Ann. 1062 (1883).
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way company. It should be noted, however, that the courts
have consistently held that "the conveyance of a right of way,
is to be regarded as a mere servitude and not as a transfer of
fee simple title of the land unless the deed itself evidences that
the parties intended otherwise. 15 2 Applying this principle to the
Tilton case, it is evident that the court was correct in concluding
that the city acted properly in transferring the right of way.
Although the city could not alienate the land, it could administer
it to the best advantage of the public.5
In opposition to the above view, some cases have held that
implied dedication grants only a servitude to the public in the
dedicated land.54 Authority for this view, which seems to be
applicable only to roads and streets, is found in the section of
the Civil Code pertaining to the servitude of way.5 5 There is a
clear implication in that section that all roads, public and private, constitute servitudes of passage. Furthermore, the court
in the Arkansas-LouisianaGas Co. v. ParkerOil Co. case, 56 which
dealt specifically with statutory dedication of a street holding
that such a dedication gives rise to ownership, declared that
implied dedication confers only a servitude. Since that decision
in 1938 the idea that the public acquires only a servitude has
been prevalent in cases dealing with roads and streets,5 7 while
the notion that the public acquires ownership seems to remain
applicable in cases dealing with lands of other descriptions.58
Although the dictum of the Parker case may be questioned in
that it was based largely upon decisions of other states, there
is authority in the Civil Code, as stated above, for such a view.
52. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Ellerbe, 199 La. 489, 6 So.2d 556 (1942). See also
Bond v. Texas & P.R.R., 181 La. 763, 160 So. 406 (1935) ; Knox v. Louisiana
Ry. & Nay. Co., 157 La. 602, 102 So. 685 (1925) ; Leader Realty Co. v. Taylor,
147 La. 256, 84 So. 648 (1920).
53. New Orleans v. Carrollton Land Co., 131 La. 1092, 60 So. 695 (1913);
Kline v. Parish of Ascension, 33 La. Ann. 562 (1881) ; Kemp v. Independence,
156 So. 56 (La. App. 1934).
54. James v. Delery, 211 La. 306, 29 So.2d 858 (1947); Arkansas-Louisiana
Gas Co. v. Parker Oil Co., 190 La. 957, 183 So. 229 (1938) ; Collins v. Zahider,
61 So.2d 897 (La. App. 1952); Brasseaux v. Ducote, 2 So.2d 769 (La. App.
1942) ; Life v. Griffith, 197 So. 646 (La. App. 1940).
55. LA. CIVIL CODE tit. IV, c. 3, § 5 (1870).
56. 190 La. 957, 183 So. 229 (1938).
57. B. F. Trappey's Sons v. City of New Iberia, 225 La. 466, 73 So.2d 423
(1954) ; James v. Delery, 211 La. 306, 29 So.2d 858 (1947) ; Brasseaux v. Ducote, 2 So.2d 769 (La. App. 1942) ; Life v. Griffith, 197 So. 646 (La. App. 1940)
(dictum). Contra: Ford v. Shreveport, 204 La. 618, 16 So.2d 127 (1943) ; Richard
v. New Orleans, 195 La. 898, 197 So. 594 (1940).
58. Locke v. Lester, 78 So.2d 14 (La. App. 1955).
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A third view concerning the interest the public acquires,
which is expressed in very few cases, is that by implied dedication the city or parish and not the public acquires full ownership of the land. For example, in Richard v. New Orleans5 9
a jactitory action in which the ownership of a street was contested, the court held that the sale of lots with reference to a
plat showing the street in question amounted to a dedication
vesting ownership in the city. This 1940 decision seems to vary
from the pattern of the previous cases.
Conclusion
With reference to statutory and "tacit" dedication, the law
seems to be well settled. Substantial compliance with R.S.
33:5051 vests ownership of dedicated lands in the public governing body, and maintenance of a road or a street for three
years by parochial or municipal authorities, under R.S. 48:491,
vests a servitude in the public. Also, in the light of the many
cases which may serve as a guide, the courts should have no
trouble in determining the applicability vel non of the doctrine
of "implied" dedication. The only problem seems to lie in ascertaining in whom the ownership rests after the latter type of
dedication has been found. It has been suggested that the seemingly inconsistent cases dealing with roads and streets can be
reconciled by distinguishing between city streets and country
roads, in that ownership of streets is (or should be) in the
public, while ownership of roads remains in individuals.0° A12
though there is no clear statement in the cases supporting such
a proposition, it might be extended into the entire field of dedication and provide a basis for remedial legislation.
Thomas D. Hardeman
59. 195 La. 898, 197 So. 594 (1940), discussed in Work of Louisiana Supreme
Court for 1939-1940 Term-Public Law, 3 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 320, 331
(1941). See also Ford v. Shreveport, 204 La. 618, 16 So.2d 127 (1943).
60. See Comment, 13 TIUL. L. REV. 606 (1939).

